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We present strong evidence that option trading volume contains information about future stock price
movements. Taking advantage of a unique dataset from the Chicago Board Options Exchange, we
construct put-call ratios from option volume initiated by buyers to open new positions. On a risk-
adjusted basis, stocks with low put-call ratios outperform stocks with high put-call ratios by more
than 40 basis points on the next day and more than 1% over the next week. Partitioning our option
signals into components that are publicly and non-publicly observable, we find that the economic
source of this predictability is non-public information possessed by option traders rather than market
inefficiency.  We  also  find  greater  predictability  from  option  signals  for  stocks  with  higher
concentrations of informed traders and from option contracts with greater leverage.
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This paper examines the informational content of option trading for future movements in
underlying stock prices. This topic addresses the fundamental economic question of how
information gets incorporated into asset prices and is also of obvious practical interest. Our
main goals are to establish the presence of informed trading in the option market and also
to explore several key issues regarding its nature.
Our focus on the informational role of derivatives comes at a time when derivatives play
an increasingly important role in ﬁnancial markets. Indeed, for the past several decades,
the capital markets have experienced an impressive proliferation of derivative securities,
ranging from equity options to ﬁxed-income derivatives to, more recently, credit derivatives.
The view that informed investors might choose to trade derivatives because of the higher
leverage oﬀered by such instruments has long been entertained by academics [e.g., Black
(1975)] and can often be found in the popular press.1 A formal treatment of this issue is
provided by Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), who allow the participation of informed
traders in the option market to be decided endogenously in an equilibrium framework. In
their model, informed investors choose to trade in both the option and the stock market – in
a “pooling equilibrium” – when the leverage implicit in options is large, when the liquidity
in the stock market is low, or when the overall fraction of informed traders is high.
Our main empirical result directly tests whether the stock and option market are in the
pooling equilibrium of Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998). Using option trades that are ini-
tiated by buyers to open new positions, we form put-call ratios to examine the predictability
of option trading for future stock price movements. We ﬁnd predictability that is strong
in both magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance. For our 1990 through 2001 sample period,
stocks with positive option signals (i.e., those with lowest quintile put-call ratios) outperform
those with negative option signals (i.e., those with highest quintile put-call ratios) by over
40 basis points per day and 1 percent per week on a risk-adjusted basis. When the stock
returns are tracked for several weeks, the level of predictability gradually dies out, indicating
that the information contained in the option volume eventually gets incorporated into the
underlying stock prices.
Although our main empirical result clearly documents that there is informed trading
in the option market, it does not necessarily imply that there is any market ineﬃciency,
because the option volume used in our main test – which is initiated by buyers to open
new positions – is not publicly observable. Indeed, information-based models [e.g., Glosten
and Milgrom (1985), Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998)] imply that prices adjust at once
to the public information contained in the trading process but may adjust slowly to the
private information possessed by informed traders. As a result, the predictability captured
in our main test may well correspond to the process of stock prices gradually adjusting to
the private component of information in option trading.
1For example, on July 25, 2002, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Chicago Board Options
Exchange was investigating “unusual trading activity” in options on shares of Wyeth, the pharmaceuticals
giant based in Madison, N.J., which experienced a sharp increase in trading volume earlier that month. The
option volume uptick occurred days before the release of a government study by the Journal of the American
Medical Association that documented a heightened risk of breast cancer, coronary heart disease, strokes and
blood clots for women who had been taking Wyeth’s hormone-replacement drug Prempro for many years.
2Motivated by the diﬀering theoretical predictions about the speed at which prices adjust
to public versus private information, we explore the predictability of publicly versus non-
publicly observable option volume. Following previous empirical studies in this area [e.g.,
Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002)], we use the Lee and
Ready (1991) algorithm to back out buyer-initiated put and call option volume from publicly
observable trade and quote records from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). We
ﬁnd that the resulting publicly observable option signals are able to predict stock returns for
only the next 1 or 2 trade days. Moreover, the stock prices subsequently reverse which raises
the question of whether the predictability from the public signal is a manifestation of price
pressure rather than informed trading. In a bivariate analysis which includes both the public
and non-public signals, the non-public signal has the same pattern of information-based
predictability as when it is used alone, but there is no predictability at all from the public
signal. This set of ﬁndings underscores the important distinction between public and non-
public signals and their respective roles in price discovery. Further, the weak predictability
exhibited by the public signal suggests that the economic source of our main result is valuable
private information in the option volume rather than an ineﬃciency across the stock and
option market.
Central to all information-based models are the roles of informed and uninformed traders.
In particular, the concentration of informed traders is a key variable in such models with
important implications for the informativeness of trading volume. Using the PIN variable
proposed by Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997) and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002)
as a measure of the prevalence of informed traders, we investigate how the predictability
from option volume varies across underlying stocks with diﬀerent concentrations of informed
traders. We ﬁnd a higher level of predictability from the option signals of stocks with a
higher prevalence of informed traders.2
While the theoretical models deﬁne informed and uninformed traders strictly in terms
of information sets, we can speculate outside of the models about who the informed and
uninformed traders might be. Our dataset is unique in that in addition to recording whether
the initiator of volume is a buyer or a seller opening or closing a position, it also identiﬁes the
investor class of the initiator. We ﬁnd that option signals from investors who trade through
full service brokerage houses provide much stronger predictability than the signals from those
who trade through discount brokerage houses. Given that the option volume from full service
brokerages includes that from hedge funds, this result is hardly surprising. It is interesting,
however, that the option signals from ﬁrm proprietary traders contain no information at all
about future stock price movements. In the framework of the information-based models,
this result suggests that ﬁrm proprietary traders are uninformed investors who come to the
option market primarily for hedging purposes.
Finally, a unique feature of the multimarket stock and option setting is the availability of
securities with diﬀering leverage. Black (1975) asserts that leverage is the key variable which
determines whether informed investors choose to trade in the option market, and Easley,
O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) demonstrate that under a natural set of assumptions this is
2Given that stocks with higher PIN are typically smaller stocks, our result could be driven by the fact
that there is higher predictability from option signals of smaller stocks. We show that this is not the case.
In particular, our PIN result remains intact after controlling for size.
3indeed the case. Motivated by these considerations, we investigate how the predictability
documented in our main test varies across option contracts with diﬀering degrees of leverage.
We ﬁnd that option signals constructed from deep out-of-the-money options, which are
highly leveraged contracts, exhibit the greatest level of predictability, while the signals from
contracts with low leverage provide very little, if any, predictability.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 synthesizes the existing theory
literature and empirical ﬁndings and develops our empirical speciﬁcations. Section 3 details
the data, Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Option Volume and Stock Prices
2.1 Theory
The theoretical motivation for our study is provided by the voluminous literature that ad-
dresses the issue of how information gets incorporated into asset prices. In this subsection
we review the theoretical literature with a focus on insights that are directly relevant for our
empirical study. In particular, we concentrate on the linkage between information generated
by the trading process and the information on the underlying asset value, the role of public
versus private information, and the process of price adjustment.4
The issue of how information gets incorporated into asset prices is central to all information-
based models. While speciﬁc modeling approaches diﬀer, information gets incorporated into
security prices as a result of the trading behavior of informed and uninformed traders. In the
sequential trade model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), a risk-neutral competitive market
maker is faced with a ﬁxed fraction µ of informed traders, who have information about the
true asset value, and a fraction 1−µ of uninformed traders, who are in the market for liquid-
ity reasons exogenous to the model. As long as market prices are not at their full-information
level, informed traders submit orders according to their information – buying after a high
signal and selling after a low signal – and proﬁt from their trade. Trade takes place sequen-
tially, and the market maker does not know whether any particular order was initiated by
an informed or an uninformed trader. He does know, however, that with probability µ,a
given trade is submitted by an informed trader. Taking this into account, he updates his
beliefs by calculating the probabilities an asset value is low or high conditional on whether
the order is a buy or a sell. He then computes the conditional expectation of the asset value,
and sets prices such that the expected proﬁt on any trade is zero. This process results in
the information contained in the trade getting impounded into market prices.
The insight that trading can reveal underlying information and aﬀect the behavior of
prices is an important contribution of the Glosten-Milgrom model. Easley and O’Hara
(1987) push this insight further by allowing traders to transact diﬀerent trade sizes, and
3Given that out-of-the-money options are typically more actively traded than in-the-money options, it
is possible that our results are driven by informed traders choosing to trade in the most liquid part of the
option market. By comparing three categories of moneyness with comparable liquidity, however, we ﬁnd
that leverage plays an independent role in the informativeness of option trading volume.
4See O’Hara (1995) for a comprehensive review and discussion of the theoretical literature and for further
references.
4hence establish the eﬀect of trade quantity on security prices. An important characteristic
of these information-based models is that prices adjust immediately to all of the public
information contained in the trade process but not to all of the private information possessed
by the informed traders. As a result, price adjustment to the full-information level is not
instantaneous, and it is only in the limit when the market maker learns the truth that
prices converge to their true values. Such models, however, do contain some results on the
speed of price adjustment. For example, using the dynamics of Bayesian learning, it can be
shown that the posteriors of a Bayesian observing an independent and identically distributed
process over time converge exponentially (see, for example, the Appendix for Chapter 3 in
O’Hara (1995)). Moreover, assuming, without much loss of generality, that the uninformed
traders buy and sell with equal probability in the Glosten-Milgrom model, this rate of price
adjustment can be shown to be µln[(1+µ)/(1−µ)], which increases monotonically with the
fraction µ of informed traders.
The linkages between trade, price, and private information are further enriched by the
introduction of derivatives as another possible venue for information-based trading.5 In
Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), the role of derivatives trading in price discovery is
examined in a multimarket sequential trade model. As in the sequential models of Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987), a fraction µ of the traders are informed
and a fraction 1−µ are uninformed.6 The uninformed traders are assumed to trade in both
markets for liquidity-based reasons that are exogenous to the model.7 The informed traders
are risk-neutral and competitive, and choose to buy or sell the stock, buy or sell a put, or
buy or sell a call, depending on the expected proﬁt from the respective trade. Each market
has a competitive market maker, who watches both the stock and option markets and sets
prices to yield zero expected proﬁt conditional on the stock or option being traded. As
in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), this price setting process entails that each market maker
updates his beliefs and calculates the conditional expected value of the respective security
(stock or option). Unlike the one-market case, however, this calculation depends not only
on the overall fraction µ of informed traders, but also on the fraction of informed traders
believed to be in each market, which is determined endogenously in the equilibrium.
5The theory literature on the informational role of derivatives includes Grossman (1988), Back (1993),
Biais and Hillion (1994), Brennan and Cao (1996), John, Koticha, Narayanan, and Subrahmanyam (2000)
and others. This review serves to guide and motivate our empirical investigation, and is by no means
exhaustive. We choose to focus on the theoretical model of Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), because
it is the most relevant to our objective of better understanding the link between option volume and future
stock prices.
6In both Easley and O’Hara (1987) and Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), whether an information
event has occurred is also uncertain. To be precise, if an information event occurs, the fractions of informed
and uninformed are µ and 1 − µ, respectively; if no information event occurs, all traders are uninformed.
While this additional layer of uncertainty plays a role in aﬀecting the magnitudes of bid/ask spread, it is
not crucial for our purposes, and we will assume that information event happens with probability one.
7As pointed out in Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), such a liquidity trader assumption is natural for
the option markets, where many trades are motivated by non-speculative reasons. For example, derivatives
could also be used to hedge additional risk factors such as stochastic volatility and jumps [Bates (2001),
Liu and Pan (2003)], to mimic dynamic portfolio strategies in a static setting [Haugh and Lo (2001)], to
hedge background risk [Franke, Stapleton, and Subrahmanyam (1998)], and to express diﬀerences of opinion
[Kraus and Smith (1996), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2002)].
5Allowing the informed traders to choose their trading venue is a key element of the mul-
timarket model of Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), and the corresponding equilibrium
solutions address directly the important issue of where informed traders trade. In a “pooling
equilibrium,” informed traders trade in both the stock and option markets, and in a “sepa-
rating equilibrium,” informed traders trade only in the stock market. As shown in Easley,
O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), the informed trader’s expected proﬁt from trading stock versus
options is the deciding factor, and quite intuitively, the condition that results in a “pooling
equilibrium” holds when the leverage implicit in options is large, when the liquidity in the
s t o c km a r k e ti sl o w ,o rw h e nt h eo v e r a l lf r a c t i o nµ of informed traders is high.
If the markets are in a pooling equilibrium, where options are used as a venue for
information-based trading, then option volume will provide “signals” about underlying stocks.
Indeed, a key testable implication of the multimarket model of Easley, O’Hara, and Srini-
vas (1998) is that in a pooling equilibrium option trades provide information about future
stock price movements. In particular, positive option trades – buying calls or selling puts
– provide positive signals to all market makers, who then increase their bid and ask prices.
Similarly, negative option trades – buying puts or selling calls – depress quotes. Further-
more, the predictive relationship between trades and prices has a multidimensional structure.
For example, any of selling a stock, buying a put, or selling a call may have the strongest
predictability for future stock prices. It turns out that option trades carry more information
than stock trades when the leverage of an option is suﬃciently high.
2.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The information content of option volume for future stock price movements has been exam-
ined previously in a number of studies, and the existing empirical evidence is mixed. On the
one hand, there is evidence that option volume contains information before the announce-
ment of important ﬁrm speciﬁc news. For example, Amin and Lee (1997) ﬁnd that a greater
proportion of long (or short) positions are initiated in the option market immediately be-
fore good (or bad) earnings news on the underlying stock. In a similar vein, Cao, Chen, and
Griﬃn (2003) show that in a sample of ﬁrms that have experienced takeover announcements,
higher pre-announcement volume on call options is predictive of higher takeover premiums.
On the other hand, there is not much evidence that during “normal” times option volume
predicts underlying stock prices. At a daily frequency, Cao, Chen, and Griﬃn (2003) ﬁnd
that during “normal” times, stock volume but not option volume is informative about fu-
ture stock returns. At higher frequencies such as at 5-minute intervals, Easley, O’Hara,
and Srinivas (1998) report clear evidence that signed option volume contains information
for contemporaneous stock prices but less decisive evidence that it contains information for
future stock prices.8 Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) conclude unambiguously that option
8Their ﬁndings about the relationship between option volume and future stock prices are diﬃcult to
interpret. Speciﬁcally, when they regress stock price changes on positive option volume (i.e., call purchases
and put sales), the coeﬃcient estimates on four of six past lags are negative; when they regress stock price
changes on negative option volume (i.e., put purchases and call sales) the coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst lag is positive.
Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) write about these coeﬃcient signs that “our failure to ﬁnd the predicted
directional eﬀects in the data is puzzling” (page 462).
6volume does not lead stock prices.9
2.2.1 The Main Test
Our empirical speciﬁcations are designed to address the fundamental question of how infor-
mation gets incorporated into security prices. Motivated to a large extent by the information-
based models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987), and Easley, O’Hara,
and Srinivas (1998), we focus our investigation on the information the trading process gen-
erates about future movements in the underlying stock prices. Speciﬁcally, let Rit be the
date-t daily return on stock i and let Xit be a set of date-t information variables extracted
from the trading of options on stock i. We test the hypothesis that information contained
in option trades, which is summarized by Xit, is valuable in predicting τ-day ahead stock
returns as predicted by the pooling equilibrium of Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998):
Rit+τ = α + βXit +  it+τ ,τ =1 ,2,.... (1)
The null hypothesis is that the market is in a separating equilibrium and the information
variable Xit has no predictive power: for all τ, β =0 .
Two types of stock returns Rit are used in the predictability tests: raw and risk-adjusted
returns. When constructing the risk-adjusted returns, we follow the standard approach in
the literature by using a four-factor model of market, size, value, and momentum to remove
the systematic component from raw stock returns. The economic motivation for using the
risk-adjusted returns is to test the information content of option trading for the idiosyncratic
component of future stock returns. If there is informed trading in the option market, there
may well be predictability of option trading for both the raw and risk-adjusted returns.
Intuitively, however, one would expect investors to have more private information about the
idiosyncratic component of stock returns, and therefore expect to see stronger predictability
from the risk-adjusted returns.
The choice of the information variables Xit determines the tests that we perform. Our





where, on date t for stock i, Pit and Cit are the number of put and call contracts purchased
by non-market makers to open new positions. If an informed trader with positive private
information on stock i acts on his information by buying “fresh” call options, this will
add to Cit and, keeping all else ﬁxed, depress the put-call ratio deﬁned in (2). On the
other hand, buying “fresh” put options on negative private information would add to Pit
and increase the put-call ratio. If the informed traders indeed use the option market as a
venue for information-based trading, then we would expect the associated β coeﬃcient in
Equation (1) to be negative and signiﬁcant.10
9Other related papers on the informational linkage between the option and stock markets include empirical
investigations by Manaster and Rendleman (1982), Stephan and Whaley (1990), Vijh (1990), Figlewski and
Webb (1993), Mayhew, Sarin, and Shastri (1995), Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2002) and others.
10One could also perform the test in Equation (1) using put and call volumes separately as information
72.2.2 Private vs. Public Information
One important implication of the information-based models is that prices adjust immedi-
ately to the public information contained in the trading process, but not necessarily to the
private information possessed by the informed traders. This fact motivates us to examine
the predictability of information variables with varying degrees of private information:
Rit+τ = α + βXit + γX
public
it +  it+τ ,τ =1 ,2,.... (3)
where X is the put-call ratio deﬁned in (2) using open-buy put and call volumes, and Xpublic
is the put-call ratio constructed using the put and call volumes that are inferred – from









Since both X and Xpublic are constructed from option volume initiated by informed and un-
informed traders, they are both imperfect measures of the information contained in option
volume. The signal quality from Xpublic, however, is inferior, because its classiﬁcation of
buyer and seller initiated contains errors, and because it makes no distinction between open-
ing and closing trades. Moreover, while Xpublic is publicly observable, X is not. Through
its mechanism for the incorporation of information into prices, the theory implies that the
predictability from Xpublic will be weaker and die out faster with increasing horizon τ.C o n -
sequently, in the regression speciﬁcation deﬁned by (3), we would expect β to be larger than
γ in both magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance. Moreover, moving the predictive regression
from τ = 1 day to longer horizons, we would expect the corresponding γ to decrease more
rapidly than β.
2.2.3 Concentration of Informed Traders
The concentration of informed traders plays an important role in the information-based
models discussed earlier. In particular, the information content of trades is higher when the
concentration of informed traders is higher. Consequently, we will examine the predictability
of the information variable X conditioning on variables that proxy for the concentration of
informed traders:
Rit+1 = α + βXit + γXit × ln(sizei)+δXit × PINi +  it+1 . (5)
In this equation, size is the market capitalization for stock i and PINi [from Easley, Kiefer,
and O’Hara (1997) and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002)] is a measure of the probability
that each trade in stock i is information-based. Within the sequential trade model under
variables. We choose to use the put-call ratio, because it provides a parsimonious way to combine the
information in the put and call volumes into one variable. Moreover, it controls for variation in option
trading volume across ﬁrms and over time. If our put-call ratio does not fully capture the information in
option volume for future stock prices, then a more ﬂexible usage of the information contained in the put and
call volumes would strengthen the results presented below.
8which the variable is developed, PIN measures the fraction µ of informed traders and captures
the prevalence of informed trading in the market. The regression speciﬁed in Equation (5)
allows the informativeness of option trade to vary across the size and PIN characteristics
of ﬁrms.11 That is, instead of being a constant β, the predictive coeﬃcient is now β +
γ ln(sizei)+δ PINi.
Insofar as PIN does capture the concentration of informed traders, and assuming that the
stock and option markets are in a pooling equilibrium with proportional fractions of informed
trading,12 we have the following expectations from this regression speciﬁcation. While a high
concentration of informed traders makes trades more informative, it also causes the market
maker to update his beliefs more aggressively, because he conditions on the fact that the
probability of informed trading is higher. As discussed earlier, this results in a higher speed
of adjustment to the true price. To the extent that this quicker price adjustment results
in information being impounded into security prices in less than a day, we would expect
prices to be eﬃcient over a daily horizon and the level of predictability from our information
variable X to be close to zero. On the other hand, if quicker price adjustment still does not
result in information getting into prices within one day, then with the information variable
X coming from a higher concentration of informed traders, one would expect it to possess
a higher level of predictability. Finally, we include size in the regression as an alternative
proxy for the concentration of informed traders. In addition, it also serves as a size control
for PIN, which is known to be negatively correlated with size.
While in a theory model, the distinction between informed and uninformed traders starts
and ends with their information sets, we can speculate outside of the models about who
the informed and uninformed traders might be. Our information variable X contains option
trading from four groups of investors: ﬁrm proprietary traders, who trade for their ﬁrms’ own
account; customers of full service brokerage ﬁrms, which include investors at hedge funds;
customers from discount brokerage ﬁrms, which include on-line brokerage ﬁrms; and other
public customers. To investigate who might have superior information, we break down the
information variable X into four components and construct put-call ratios using put and call
open-buy volume from each of the four groups of investors separately:












it +  it+1 . (6)
We would expect the groups with higher concentrations of informed traders to possess higher
levels of predictability. According to conventional wisdom, ﬁrm proprietary traders and
hedge funds would be among these groups.
2.2.4 Option Leverage
It is useful to break down option volume into ﬁner partitions by separating options according
to their moneyness. A key motivation for partitioning along this dimension is that options
with varying moneyness provide investors with diﬀering levels of leverage. As hypothesized
11To be more precise, both size and PIN have time variation, although the frequency of their variation is
much slower than the variation in X.
12This can be shown to be true under certain parameter restrictions in the pooling equilibrium results of
Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998).
9by Black (1975) and demonstrated by Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), the leverage of
an option is a key determinant of whether a pooling equilibrium, where informed investors
choose to also trade in the option market, exists. As noted by Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas
(1998), their model could be extended so that traders choose not just between stock and
a single call and put but rather between stock and calls and puts with diﬀerent levels of
leverage.
Motivated by these considerations, we break down the information variable X into groups
of varying leverage, and run predictive regressions of the form:
Rit+1 = α + β
Moneyness CategoryX
Moneyness Category
it +  it+1 , (7)
where XMoneyness Category is the put-call ratio constructed using out-of- the-money (OTM),
near-the-money, or in-the-money (ITM) put and call open-buy volumes. For an informed
trader with positive (negative) information about the underlying stock, buying an out-of- the-
money call (put) option provides the highest leverage while buying an in-the-money call (put)
option provides the lowest leverage.13 We would therefore expect βOTM to be higher than
βITM in both magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance if privately informed investor choose to
trade options that provide them with higher leverage. Given that out-of-the-money options
are typically more actively traded than in-the-money options, we may also ﬁnd this result if
informed traders choose to trade on their private information in the most liquid part of the
option market.
3D a t a
3.1 The Option Dataset
The main data for this paper were obtained from the CBOE. The data consist of daily records
of trading volume activity for all CBOE listed options from the beginning of January 1990
through the end of December 2001. Each option in our dataset is identiﬁed by its underlying
stock or index, as a put or call, and by its strike price and time to expiration. In contrast to
other option datasets (e.g., the Berkeley Option Data Base or OptionMetrics), one feature
that is unique to our dataset is that for each option, the associated daily trading volume is
subdivided into 16 categories deﬁned by four trade types and four investor classes.
The four trade types are: “open-buys” which are initiated by a buyer to open a new option
position, “open-sells” which are initiated by a seller to open a new position, “close-buys”
which are initiated by a buyer to close an existing short position, and “close-sells” which
are initiated by a seller to close an existing long position. This classiﬁcation of trade types
provides two advantages over the data sets that have been used previously. First, we know
with certainty the “sign” of the trading volume. By contrast, the existing literature on the
informational content of option trading volume at best infers the sign, with some error, from
13Suppose that the underlying stock has a good piece of information and increases over one day by 5%.
Assuming a 40% volatility for this particular stock, the Black and Scholes (1973) value of a one-month option
increases by 49% for a 5% in-the-money call option, 62% for an at-the-money call option, and 77% for a
5% out-of-the-money call option. In the same situation, the Black- Scholes value of a one-year call option
increases by 17%.
10Table 1: Option trading volume by trade type and investor class
Daily data from 1990 through 2001 except where otherwise noted. On each trade date,
the cross-section of equity options is sorted by the underlying stock market capitalization
into small, medium, and large size terciles. The reported numbers are time-series means of
cross-sectional averages. For index options, the reported numbers are time-series averages.
open buy open sell close buy close sell
put call put call put call put call
Panel A: Equity options
Small stocks
a v g v o l u m e 1 65 3 1 84 9 8 1 8 92 6
% from Prop 7.48 4.46 5.42 4.09 4.42 4.84 3.83 3.75
% from Discount 7.35 12.92 9.96 11.97 7.81 11.14 6.74 11.89
% from Full Serv 72.61 71.73 75.84 73.66 77.90 72.09 75.96 71.60
Medium stocks
a v g v o l u m e 3 89 6 3 68 9 1 7 3 9 2 15 7
% from Prop 10.87 8.81 9.89 7.62 8.19 8.17 6.76 6.85
% from Discount 8.49 12.48 9.38 9.97 8.67 9.34 9.73 12.27
% from Full Serv 69.22 67.90 71.38 72.37 71.42 69.89 69.36 68.14
Large stocks
avg volume 165 359 135 314 66 159 90 236
% from Prop 14.45 11.36 13.61 10.14 11.18 9.86 9.19 8.25
% from Discount 9.77 13.18 7.83 8.02 7.73 7.55 11.31 13.64
% from Full Serv 63.60 64.70 69.68 71.98 68.72 69.95 65.27 65.84
Panel B: Index options
S&P 500 (SPX)
avg volume 17398 10254 12345 11138 7324 7174 10471 6317
% from Prop 23.51 34.29 35.71 25.51 32.51 20.05 20.10 28.24
% from Discount 4.22 4.19 1.38 1.59 1.48 1.72 4.45 4.78
% from Full Serv 58.24 48.16 48.81 59.45 49.75 63.79 59.58 51.72
S&P 100 (OEX)
avg volume 25545 19112 12825 11900 9024 9401 20232 15870
% from Prop 6.04 11.01 18.13 10.05 19.78 11.07 6.31 10.42
% from Discount 12.32 14.04 4.76 5.06 4.56 5.13 12.49 14.08
% from Full Serv 64.61 58.67 60.52 67.48 54.19 61.84 62.79 56.74
Nasdaq 100 (NDX), from 1994/2/7 to 2001/12/31
avg volume 1757 1119 1412 1369 815 949 1185 748
% from Prop 22.68 33.25 35.90 22.69 34.22 17.43 16.71 26.50
% from Discount 5.90 9.76 2.85 2.66 4.46 3.02 7.10 11.74
% from Full Serv 62.83 49.61 53.49 65.09 50.95 66.86 65.18 52.23
11quote and trade information using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.14 Second, unlike
the previous literature, we know whether the initiator of observed volume is opening a new
option position or closing one that he or she already had outstanding. This information may
be useful because the motivation and hence the informational content behind trades that
open and close positions may be diﬀerent.
The volume data is also categorized according to which of four investor classes initiates
the trades. The four investor classes are: ﬁrm proprietary traders, public customers of
discount brokers, public customers of full service brokers, and other public customers.15 For
example, an employee of Goldman Sachs who trades for the banks own account is a ﬁrm
proprietary trader. Clients of E-Trade are designated as discount customers, while clients of
Merrill Lynch are designated as full service customers. This classiﬁcation of trading volume
by investor type could potentially shed some light on heterogeneity that exists in the option
market.
Table 1 provides a summary of option trading volume by trade type and investor class.
Panel A details the information for equity options, which are sorted on each trade date by
their underlying stock size into terciles (small, medium and large). The reported numbers
are the time-series means of the cross-sectional averages, and for the same underlying stock,
option volumes associated with diﬀerent strike prices and times to expiration are aggregated
together. From Panel A, we can see that in the equity option market, the trading volume
for call options is on average much higher than that for put options, and this is true across
the open-buy, open-sell, close-buy and close-sell categories. Comparing the total open-buy
volume with the total open-sell volume, we do see that the buy volume is slightly higher than
the sell volume, but the diﬀerence is too small to conﬁrm the common belief that options
are actively bought rather than sold by non-market maker investors. For each trade type
and for both calls and puts, customers of full service brokers account for more than half of
the trading volume regardless of the market capitalization of the underlying stock.16 On a
relative basis, the ﬁrm proprietary traders are more active in options on larger stocks.
Panel B paints a somewhat diﬀerent picture of the trading activity for the options on
three major stock indices. Unlike in the equity option market, the total trading volume for
call options is on average similar to that for put options, and in many cases, the call volume
is lower than the put volume. Comparing the total open-buy volume with the open-sell
volume, we do see that index options, especially puts, are more actively bought than sold
by investors who are not market makers. The customers of full service brokers are still the
dominant player, but the ﬁrm proprietary traders account for more trading volume in both
the SPX and NDX markets than they do in the equity option market.
14Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) and Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) both proceed in this way.
15To be more speciﬁc, the Option Clearing Corporation (OCC) assigns one of three origin codes to each
option transaction: public customer, ﬁrm proprietary trader, or market maker. Our data cover all non-
market maker volume. The public customer data were subdivided by an analyst at the CBOE into orders
that originated from discount customers, full service customers, or other customers. The other customer
category consists of all public customer transactions that were not designated by the CBOE analyst as
originating from discount or full service customers.
16The trading percentages in the table do not sum to 100, because (for sake of brevity) the percentage for
the other public customer category, which is 100 minus the sum, has been omitted.
123.2 Daily Cross-Sections of Stocks and their Put-Call Ratios
In preparation for the empirical tests outlined in Section 2.2, we construct daily cross-
sections of stocks by merging the option dataset with the CRSP daily stock data. We
provide a detailed account for the merged open-buy data, which will be the main focus of
our empirical tests.
The open-buy subset includes all option trading volume that is initiated by buyers to
open new option positions. On each day, we calculate the total open-buy volume for each
stock. This includes both put and call volume across all available strike prices and times to
expiration. We eliminate stocks with illiquid option trading by retaining only those stocks
with total open-buy volume of at least 50 option contracts. We then merge this dataset with
the CRSP daily data to obtain the daily return and trading volume of the underlying stocks.
This construction of cross-sectional pools of stocks is done on a daily basis, so some stocks
might disappear from our dataset on certain days because of low option trading activity and
then re-appear as a result of increased activity. On average, the cross-sectional sample size
increases substantially from 91 stocks in 1990 to 359 stocks in 2001, which reﬂects the overall
expansion of the equity option market over this period.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the key information variable extracted from the option trading
activity is the open-buy put-call ratio, which is the ratio of put open-buy volume to the put-
plus-call open-buy volume. For our cross-sectional sample, the put-call ratio is on average
30%, which is consistent with our earlier observation that in the equity option market, the
trading volume for call options is on average higher than that for put options. Sorting the
daily cross-sections of stocks into quintiles according to their put-call ratios, the average
put-call ratio is 0.1% for the lowest quintile and 80% for the highest quintile. Given that the
put-call ratio for each stock is updated daily using its open-buy option volume, the ratio is
potentially quite dynamic in the sense that a stock with a very low put-call ratio today might
end up with a very high put-call ratio tomorrow. In fact, the ratio is somewhat persistent
insofar as 58% of stocks in the lowest quintile remain there on the following day while 42% of
the stock in the highest quintile one day remain there the next. The persistence is somewhat
lower for stocks with moderate put-call ratios. Indeed, the corresponding probabilities are
25%, 30%, and 32% for stocks belonging to the second, third, and fourth put-call ratio
quintiles.
Other than the obvious diﬀerences in their put-call ratios, the quintile portfolios do not
exhibit any signiﬁcant variation in size, book-to-market, momentum, or analyst coverage.
The ratio of option trading volume to stock trading volume is only 8 basis points, and it
also does not exhibit any signiﬁcant variation across the put-call ratio quintile portfolios.
Overall, the put-call ratio does not seem to be related to any of the stock characteristics
which are well-known to be related to average stock returns or to the relative trading activity
between the option and stock markets.
3.3 Trading Behavior of Various Investor Classes
One unique feature of our option dataset is the classiﬁcation of option traders into ﬁrm pro-
prietary traders, customers of discount brokers, customers of full service brokers, and other
public customers. Although the information-based models’ informed traders likely reside in
13all four investor classes, one might well expect the informed traders to be concentrated in
the categories of traders who are believed to be more “sophisticated.” This would include
hedge funds, which belong to the full service category, and ﬁrm proprietary traders. It is
therefore instructive for us to perform a comprehensive analysis of the trading behavior of
the four investor classes.
We ﬁrst examine what type of option contracts the four investor classes are more likely
to buy to establish new long positions. In Panel A of Table 2, we partition the open-buy
call or put volume into ﬁve categories of moneyness using the ratio of option strike price
to the spot price. For example, a 5% OTM call option has a strike-to-spot ratio of 1.05,
while a 5% OTM put option has a strike-to-spot ratio of 0.95. We deﬁne near-the-money
options as call and put options with strike-to-spot ratio between 0.97 and 1.03. Analyzing
each investor class separately, we calculate how much open-buy volume goes to the speciﬁed
moneyness category as a percentage of the total open-buy volume. For example, Panel A
shows that 30.6% of the open-buy call volume traded by ﬁrm proprietary traders is near
the money, 24.4% is between 3% and 10% OTM, and 14.7% is between 3% and 10% ITM.
Overall, Panel A indicates that while all investors tend to trade more OTM options than
ITM options, this pattern seems to be strongest for customers from discount brokerage ﬁrms,
and weakest for ﬁrm proprietary traders. In other words, relative to the discount investors,
ﬁrm proprietary traders distribute their trades more evenly among the lower premia OTM
options and the higher premia ITM options. Examining the trading behavior by option
time to expiration, Panel B indicates a pattern of buying more short-dated options than
long-dated options, and this pattern is present for all of the investor classes.
We next examine when each investor class is more likely to buy put or call options to
establish new long positions. Given that our main tests will examine stock returns over short
horizons after option volume is observed, we examine how past-week returns inﬂuence option
buying by sorting stocks on a daily basis into quintiles based upon their returns over the past
ﬁve trade days.17 As is seen in Panel C, the four investor classes behave quite similarly, with
only slight diﬀerence between ﬁrm proprietary traders and the public customer classes (i.e.,
discount, full service, and other public customers). For example, while the public customers
distribute their open-buy call volume almost evenly among the ﬁve categories of past-week
performance, the ﬁrm proprietary traders tend to buy fewer call options on stocks that have
done poorly in the past week. One possible explanation is that ﬁrm proprietary traders buy
call options to hedge their short positions in underlying stocks, and the incentive for such
hedging is lower when the underlying stock has performed poorly. Similarly, the motive
for buying put options to hedge long stock position is lower when the underlying stock has
performed well, and we see that ﬁrm proprietary traders buy fewer puts on high performing
stocks.
Finally, we examine on which type of underlying stocks each investor class is more likely
to buy options. We investigate two stock characteristics that are important for our later
analysis: stock size and stock PIN, which, as explained in the previous section, is a measure
of the probability of information-based trading in the underlying stock market. For ease of
comparison, we use NYSE size deciles and NYSE PIN deciles to categorize our cross-section
17We also performed a similar analysis using momentum deciles and found that momentum is not a factor
that induces distinct trading patterns across the investor classes.
14Table 2: Option trading behavior of four investor classes
For each investor class, the reported numbers are the open-buy call (or put) volume belonging to
each category as a percentage of the total open-buy call (or put) volume for the investor class. OTM
denotes out-of-the-money options, and ITM denotes in-the-money options. PIN is a measure of the
probability that any given trade on an underlying stock is information-based. In Panel D, NYSE
size cutoﬀs are used to categorize underlying stocks into small (bottom 30%), medium, and large
(top 30%) groups. In Panel E, NYSE PIN cutoﬀs are used to categorize underlying stocks into low
(bottom 30%), medium, and high (top 30%) groups.
prop discount full serv other
call put call put call put call put
Panel A: Option moneyness
above 10% OTM 14.3 22.8 26.8 29.6 20.9 24.6 22.2 25.5
3% to 10% OTM 24.4 24.9 31.2 32.3 27.9 27.3 27.5 26.1
near-the-money 30.6 27.9 26.0 27.6 26.1 26.4 26.4 27.1
3% to 10% ITM 14.7 11.9 9.6 7.8 13.1 13.3 12.7 13.6
above 10% ITM 16.0 12.4 6.4 2.8 12.0 8.4 11.3 7.7
Panel B: Option time to expiration
under 30 Days 35.5 39.6 40.2 52.5 37.3 44.4 38.4 46.8
30 to 59 Days 28.6 25.2 27.6 26.6 29.4 29.9 29.1 27.5
60 to 89 Days 7.8 7.0 7.7 6.3 7.6 6.7 7.4 6.3
90 to 179 Days 17.7 15.5 15.3 10.9 16.1 12.8 15.6 13.0
above 179 Days 10.3 12.7 9.2 3.7 9.6 6.1 9.5 6.3
Panel C: Past-week stock return
lowest 13.8 18.2 20.8 15.5 19.4 18.2 19.0 17.6
2nd to lowest 19.7 21.6 20.2 18.2 20.0 20.2 19.4 20.1
medium 23.4 23.5 19.6 21.2 20.4 21.5 20.2 21.3
2nd to highest 23.7 21.3 19.3 22.8 20.3 21.2 20.7 21.3
highest 19.4 15.5 20.1 22.3 19.9 19.0 20.7 19.7
Panel D: Underlying stock size
small 1.4 1.6 3.6 1.6 4.5 2.8 4.2 2.7
medium 13.4 11.7 17.3 12.8 18.7 16.8 17.5 14.9
large 85.2 86.7 79.0 85.6 76.8 80.4 78.3 82.4
Panel E: Underlying stock PIN
low 80.9 82.9 78.7 86.0 77.1 81.1 77.1 81.1
medium 17.6 15.7 20.0 13.2 21.2 17.7 21.2 17.6
high 1.5 1.3 1.3 0.8 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.3
15of stocks into various size and PIN groups. We obtained stock PIN values for all NYSE
and AMEX stocks from Soeren Hvidkjaer’s website. Panels D shows, unsurprisingly, that
investors trade more options on larger stocks. This eﬀect is especially pronounced for ﬁrm
proprietary traders who buy fewer options on small stocks and more options on large stocks
than the public customer investor classes. Panel E examines the trading behavior across
diﬀerent stock PIN. The fact that all investor classes trade more options on stocks with
lower PIN is related to the fact that they trade more options on larger stocks, because stock
PIN has a correlation of −61% with stock size. In our empirical work below, we control for
this correlation between stock size and stock PIN.
Overall, our analysis indicates that the four investor classes exhibit similar trading pat-
terns with respect to types of option contracts and characteristics of underlying stocks. This,
however, does not imply that their trading activities are highly correlated. In fact, the open-
buy put-call ratio from ﬁrm proprietary traders has a correlation of only 2% with that from
discount investors, 8% with full service investors, and 8% with other public investors. By
contrast, the public customers classes trade more alike one another. For example, the open-
buy put-call ratio from the full service customers has a correlation of 24% with the discount
customers, and 23% with the other public customers. The higher correlation in the trading of
the public customer classes, however, by no means guarantees that the information content
of their trading volume is the same. In fact, we will show in Section 4.4 that this is not the
case.
3.4 Publicly versus Privately Observable Option Volume
Another unique feature of our dataset is that it is partitioned into four non-publicly observ-
able subsets: open-buy, open-sell, close-buy and close-sell. The availability of non-publicly
observable information sets provides us with the opportunity to study some direct implica-
tions of the information-based models regarding the incorporation of private versus public
information into asset prices.
In preparation for such an analysis, which will be carried out in Section 4.3, we use
the Berkeley Option Database (BOD) to construct option volume signals that are publicly
observable. The BOD provides the time (to the nearest second), price, and number of
contracts for every option transaction that takes place at the CBOE. It also contains all bid
and ask price quotations on the CBOE time stamped to the nearest second. Every option
transaction, of course, has both a buyer and a seller. Following standard practice (e.g.,
Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) and Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002)) we use the Lee
and Ready (1991) algorithm to classify all option trades as buyer- or seller-initiated. We use
the same implementation of the Lee and Ready algorithm as Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas
(1998). In particular, for each option transaction we identify the prevailing bid-ask quotation,
i.e., the most recent previous bid-ask quotation. If the transaction price is above (below)
the bid-ask midpoint, we classify the transaction volume as buyer-(seller-)initiated. If the
transaction occurs at the bid-ask midpoint, we then apply the “tick test” which stipulates
that if the current trade price is higher (lower) than the previous one the transaction volume
is classiﬁed as buyer-(seller-)initiated. If the previous trade was at the same price, then the
“tick test” is applied using the last transaction which occurred at a price diﬀerent than the
16current transaction.
After backing out the buyer-initiated and seller-initiated option volume from the BOD,
we merge the public option volume with our option dataset to construct daily cross-sections
of stocks with both public and non-public volume information. The data sample is shortened
to 1990-1996 because the BOD discontinued at the end of 1996.
To decompose the option volume into public and non-public components, we regress put-
call ratios constructed from the four non-public volume types onto put-calls ratio constructed
from public option volume. As shown in Panel A of Table 3, there is a strong positive correla-
tion between the non-publicly observable buy signals (i.e., open-buy and close-buy), and the
publicly observable buyer-initiated signal. Similarly, there are clear positive relationships be-
tween the non-publicly observable sell signals (i.e., open-sell and close-sell) and the publicly
observable seller-initiated signal. It is important, however, to note that since the average R2
from the cross-sectional regressions range from 13% to 45% a large fraction of the non-public
signals still remain unexplained by the public signal. According to the information-based
models, while the publicly explained component should get incorporated into security prices
very quickly, the unexplained component should play an important role in predicting future
stock prices. We will test these predictions in Section 4.3.
Finally, we report in Panel B of Table 2, decompositions of open-buy put-call ratios by
various investor classes into public and non-public components. The results are similar to
those in Panel A for the open-buy volume aggregated over all investor classes. There is,
however, some variation across the investor classes in the explanatory power of the public
signal. This variation does not necessarily indicate whose private signals are more private.
In fact, the variation in explanatory power is driven mostly by the presence of each investor
class in the equity option market. Given that the buyer-initiated volume is an aggregation
of the volumes contributed by all investor classes and that full service investors account for
about 70% of the total volume aggregated over the four investor classes, it is not surprising
that open-buy signals from full service investors are among the most highly correlated with
the public signal constructed from buyer-initiated volume. The relative informativeness of
option trading across investor classes will be examined in Section 4.4.
4T h e R e s u l t s
4.1 The Main Test
As detailed in Section 2.2, our empirical speciﬁcations investigate the existence and economic
sources of option volume predictability for future stock returns. Daily data from 1990 through
2001 are used to construct a time-series of cross-sectional pools of stocks. On each trade
day, stocks with at least 50 contracts of open-buy volume are included in the cross-sectional
pool.18 Consequently, the size of the cross-sections ﬂuctuate over time, and, on average,
there are 242 stocks in the daily cross-sectional pools.
18The 50 contract cutoﬀ prevents a single or very small number of contracts from unduly inﬂuencing the
put-call ratios that we employ in our tests. We experimented with diﬀerent cutoﬀ levels, including 20 and
100 contracts of open-buy volume. Our ﬁndings are robust to these variations.
17Table 3: The public component of option volume
This table reports results of daily cross-sectional regressions from 1990 through 1996. The
dependent variables are put-call ratios constructed from various non-publicly observable
option volume. The independent variables are put-call ratios constructed from publicly
observable option volume that has been classiﬁed as buyer-initiated or seller-initiated by
the Lee and Ready algorithm. Fama-MacBeth standard errors are used to compute the
t-statistics reported in square brackets. The R2s are time-series averages of cross-sectional
R2s.
public signal (Lee-Ready) intercept
buyer initiated seller initiated
R2
Panel A: By volume type
0.08 0.74 open buy
[90.4] [304.1]
45%
0.16 0.42 close buy
[111.5] [94.3]
13%
0.11 0.60 open sell
[124.3] [205.9]
35%
0.05 0.79 close sell
[34.4] [232.3]
40%













18As speciﬁed in Equation (1), we regress the next-day four-factor adjusted stock return on
the open-buy put-call ratio. We ﬁnd a slope coeﬃcient of −53 basis points with a t-statistic
of −32.92.19 This result implies that buying stocks with zero put-call ratio and selling stocks
with put-call ratio of one would yield, over the next day, an average proﬁt of 53 basis points
in risk-adjusted returns. It should be realized, however, that although it is not unusual
to observe in our cross-sections a number of stocks with put-call ratios close to zero it is
less common to observe put-call ratios close to one. Indeed, when we sort the stocks in our
daily cross-sections into quintiles based upon their put-call ratios, the bottom quintile has an
average put-call ratio close to zero while the top quintile average put-call ratio is about 0.8.
When we form equal weight portfolios of the low and high quintile put-call ratio stocks, we
ﬁnd that, on average, the next-day risk-adjusted returns are, respectively, 15.7 basis points
and −26.6 basis points. These results translate into an average daily return of 42 basis points
for a zero net investment hedge portfolio which buys stocks with low put-call ratios and sells
stocks with high put-call ratios. The t-statistic for this next day risk-adjusted return to the
hedge portfolio is 28.55, and the Sharpe ratio is 0.52.
Predictability of this magnitude and signiﬁcance clearly rejects the null hypothesis that
the stock and option markets are in a separating equilibrium with informed investors trading
only in the stock market. In order to explore further how information in option volume gets
incorporated into underlying stock prices, we extend the horizon of predictability and regress
the +2-day, +3-day, +4-day, etc., four-factor adjusted stock returns on the open-buy put-call
ratios. The slope coeﬃcients and their 95% conﬁdence intervals are reported in Figure 1.
The magnitude of the coeﬃcients appears to decay exponentially, in accordance with the
predictions of the information-based models. Moreover, there is no reversal (i.e., positive
coeﬃcients) over longer horizons which indicates that the predictability is truly information-
based rather than the result of mechanical price pressure.20 From Figure 1, we can also see
that over the ﬁrst week after the option volume is observed, predictability from the open-buy
put-call ratio remains strong in magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance. In fact, the coeﬃcients
from the ﬁrst ﬁve days add up to over 1%. Over time, however, the predictability tapers
oﬀ, and after three weeks the coeﬃcients are close to zero in both economic and statistical
terms.
19All standard errors are calculated using Fama and MacBeth (1973) to correct for cross-sectional correla-
tion. In the case of daily regressions using weekly returns, we further control for the time-series correlation
by using Newey and West (1987) with 5 lags. The reason that the slope coeﬃcient is reported in basis points
is that throughout the paper we convert returns to basis points before performing regressions. As a result,
the coeﬃcients can be interpreted as the average basis point change in a stock’s next day return when its
open-buy volume goes from being all calls to all puts.
20Given that market makers typically delta-hedge their option positions in the underlying stock market, it
is possible that their hedging activity could produce a mechanical price pressure even if the original option
trade is not information-based. If this were occurring, one would expect a reversal, which is not observed
in Figure 1. Furthermore, market makers typically delta-hedge their positions on the same trading day on
which they are established, which is unlikely to aﬀect the stock price on the next or subsequent days. Finally,
option trading volume on average accounts for less than 10 bps of the underlying stock volume, which also
reduces the plausibility of the price-pressure explanation.






































Figure 1: The predictability of open-buy option volume signal for future stock
returns. Daily stock returns Rit+τ — risk-adjusted and τ trade days ahead of the option
trading — are regressed on the day-t open-buy put-call ratio for stock i. Reported are the
slope coeﬃcients and the 95% conﬁdence intervals, using Fama-MacBeth standard errors.
204.2 Further Analysis of Main Test
One possible concern regarding our main test result is that the CBOE option market closes
each day after the underlying stock market. The diﬀerence in closing time raises the possi-
bility that part of our result for day +1 reﬂects information that is released after the stock
market closes but while the option market is still open. It is possible that such information
is, in fact, reﬂected simultaneously in both the option market volume and in stock prices
(in the aftermarket) on day +0, but that our methodology makes it appear that the option
market volume on day +0 is informative for next day stock prices.21
It happens that there was a change in the closing time of the CBOE market during our
sample period which makes it possible to assess whether it is likely that any appreciable
part of our day +1 result is driven by the diﬀerence in the closing time of the option and
underlying stock markets. In particular, prior to June 23, 1997, the closing time for CBOE
options on individual stocks was 4:10 pm (EST), 10 minutes after the closing of the cash
market. On June 23, 1997, the CBOE changed the closing time for options on individual
stocks to 4:02 pm (EST), 2 minutes after the closing of the underlying stock market.22
Consequently, if an important part of our day +1 result occurs because of the diﬀerence
in the closing time of the two markets, we would expect to see the day +1 result decline
signiﬁcantly after June 23, 1997.
In order to check whether the strength of the day +1 ﬁnding declined after the change
in the CBOE closing time, we re-ran the day +1 regression pre- and post-1997. The slope
coeﬃcient for the period prior to 1997 is −46 basis points with a t-statistic of −22.31, while
the slope coeﬃcient for the period after 1997 is −60 basis points with a t-statistic of −20.86.
Since the predictive result does not decline after the signiﬁcant shortening of the closing
time diﬀerence, we believe that it is unlikely that the diﬀerence in stock and option market
closing times has any important impact on our ﬁndings.23
To understand the extent to which the liquidity of the underlying stock market has an
impact on the predictability documented above, we add two liquidity control variables —
turnover and bid/ask spread — to our main test. These controls are important, because
stock returns are known to be related to trading volume (See, for example, Chordia and
Swaminathan (2000), Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) and references therein). Table 4
reports the results from predictive regressions with various sets of control variables. The
sample period is shortened to 1993-2001, because the TAQ data from which bid/ask spreads
are extracted only became available in 1993. The diﬀerence in sample period contributes to
the small diﬀerence between the slope coeﬃcient in our main result above and that reported
in the ﬁrst row of Table 4. To allow the liquidity variables their best chance of impacting the
21This is because by using CRSP daily returns, we compute the stock return for day +1 from the closing
stock prices on day +0 and day +1.
22This change was made in an eﬀort to eliminate market disruptions that were occurring when news
announcements, particularly earnings reports, were made when the option market was open and the under-
lying stock market was closed. The closing time of 4:15 pm (EST) for options on nine broad market indices
including the S&P 100 (OEX), S&P 500 (SPX), and Nasdaq-100 (NDX) was unaﬀected.
23We also checked whether our results are driven by any particular subperiod of our sample, by performing
the day +1 regression for each of the 12 calendar years from 1990 to 2001. The ﬁndings were extremely
consistent across the years.
21slope coeﬃcient on the put-call ratio, we use turnover and spread that are contemporaneous
with the stock returns. The results indicate that the liquidity controls have little impact
on the magnitude or statistical signiﬁcance for next-day stock return predictability from the
option volume. We also used lagged turnover and spread as control variables with much the
same result.
Table 4: Predictive regressions with controls for liquidity and short-term reversal
This table reports the results of daily cross-sectional regressions from 1993-2001. The dependent
variable is the next day four-factor risk-adjusted return. The put-call ratio is open-buy put volume
divided by the sum of open-buy put plus call volume. Turnover is the ratio of stock trading volume
to shares outstanding and is in percentage. The spread is the closing ask price minus the closing bid
price of the underlying stock. R−5,−1 is the raw return over the past ﬁve trade days. All returns
a r ee x p r e s s e di nb a s i sp o i n t s ,a n dt h et-statistics reported in square brackets are computed from
Fama-MacBeth standard errors.
intercept put-call ratio turnover spread R−5,−1
13.04 −59.31
[11.00] [−32.82]
2.12 −55.10 6.47 3.34
[1.40] [−31.68] [6.82] [2.02]
13.73 −55.62 −0.028
[12.25] [−31.56] [−23.53]
3.02 −51.23 6.60 3.56 −0.032
[2.09] [−30.21] [6.86] [2.19] [−27.69]
Another important control variable is a stock’s own past week return. We investigated
the stock returns leading up to the day where option volume is observed and found that
stocks with high put-call ratios typically outperform stocks with low put-call ratios. After
the option volume observation, however, our main result indicates that high put-call ratio
stocks underperform low put-call ratio stocks. This pattern of returns before and after
option volume observation is consistent with the short-term reversal documented by Lo and
MacKinlay (1990). To see whether our main result is simply due to the well-documented
empirical fact of short-term reversal, we add the past ﬁve day stock return R−5,−1 as a control
variable. As is seen in the bottom two rows of Table 4, while the short-term reversal is quite
signiﬁcant in our sample, it has a very small eﬀect on our main result.
Performing our analysis using raw returns rather than four-factor risk-adjusted returns
produces similar but slightly weaker results in terms of both magnitude and statistical sig-
niﬁcance. For example, the slope coeﬃcient from regressing next-day raw returns on the
open-buy put-call ratio is −50 basis points with a t-statistic of −28.17, and the average
next-day return from buying stocks in the lowest quintile of put-call ratios and selling stocks
in the highest quintile of put-call ratios is 38.4 basis points with a t-statistic of 23.9. The
slightly weaker results for raw returns are consistent with informed traders bringing ﬁrm spe-
22ciﬁc rather than market-wide information to the option market. Since risk-adjusted returns
are a better proxy than raw returns for the idiosyncratic component of stock returns, it is
not surprising that risk-adjusted returns are somewhat better predicted by the information
contained in option trading.
Finally, to get some sense of whether the predictability we document is related to promi-
nent ﬁrm-speciﬁc news announcements, we repeat our main test after removing from the
daily cross-sections all stocks that are within ﬁve trade days of an earnings announcement.
The results are extremely similar.
4.3 Private vs. Public Information
One important implication of the information-based models discussed in Section 2.1 is that
prices adjust more quickly to the public information contained in the trade process and less
quickly to the private information of informed traders which cannot be inferred from publicly
observable trade. This implication of the information-based models is consistent with our
ﬁndings that the predictability of non-publicly observable open-buy option volume lasts for
several weeks into the future.
Our ability to distinguish between publicly and non-publicly observed information pro-
vides an excellent opportunity to investigate whether information which has varying degrees
of public observability gets incorporated into security prices with diﬀering speed. To carry
out this investigation we apply the Lee and Ready algorithm to the publicly observable trade
and quote information in the Berkeley Option Database (BOD) and classify CBOE option
trading volume into buyer- and seller-initiated. Because the BOD dataset ends in 1996, the
results reported in this section are based on daily data from 1990 through 1996.
As speciﬁed in Equation (3), we perform predictive regressions using put-call ratios con-
structed from open-buy volume as well as from Lee-Ready buyer-initiated volume. We
perform univariate regressions using one information variable at a time to document their
predictability when used independently, and we also perform a bivariate regression using both
the open-buy and Lee-Ready buyer-initiated put-call ratios to examine their marginal pre-
dictabilities. In the univariate regressions, we apply the same 50-contract (for, respectively,
open-buy volume or Lee-Ready buyer-initiated volume) rule to construct the cross-sectional
pools of stocks, and in the bivariate regression, we require a stock to have at least 50 contracts
of open-buy volume and one contract of Lee-Ready buyer-initiated volume to be included in
the cross-sectional pools.24
We ﬁnd that regressing the next-day risk-adjusted stock returns on the open-buy put-
call ratio yields a slope coeﬃcient of −46 basis points with a t-statistic of −22.31, while
regressing the next-day risk-adjusted stock returns on the Lee-Ready put-call ratio yields
a slope coeﬃcient of −30 basis points with a t-statistic of −13.51. These results seem
to suggest that, when used independently, both publicly and non-publicly observed option
volume have predictability for next-day stock returns. When used together in a bivariate
regression, however, the predictability in the non-publicly observed option volume remains
24Given that open-buy volume accounts only for the open portion of the total buy volume, it is typically the
case that a stock with 50 contracts of open-buy volume has at last 50 contracts of Lee-Ready buyer-initiated
volume. The main features of the results are the same across a number of diﬀerent cutoﬀ rules.
23while that in the publicly observed option volume becomes statistically insigniﬁcant at the
95% conﬁdence level. Speciﬁcally, the slope coeﬃcient on open-buy put-call ratio is −44
b a s i sp o i n t sw i t hat-statistic of −16.27, while the slope coeﬃcient on Lee-Ready put-call
ratio is −5 basis points with a t-statistic of −1.68.
To get a more detailed picture of the process of information incorporation, we extend the
predictability horizon, and perform the univariate and bivariate regressions using daily risk-
adjusted returns for day +2, day +3, etc. The slope coeﬃcients and their 95% conﬁdence
intervals are reported in Figure 2. The univariate regression on the open-buy put-call ratio
is the 1990-1996 subsample result of the main test reported in Figure 1 and shares its main
features. The univariate regression on Lee-Ready classiﬁed volume reveals that although
there is predictability for the next-day stock returns, it is not clear whether this predictability
is information-based. In particular, unlike the predictability from the open-buy volume, the
predictability from the publicly observable Lee-Ready option volume dies out much faster
and there is a certain degree of reversal as well.
The bivariate regression using both publicly and non-publicly observed option volume
presents an even more intriguing picture. After controlling for the information embedded
in the open-buy volume, the publicly observable Lee-Ready option volume no longer has
any signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient estimates, and, consequently, has no predictability con-
sistent with an information-based story. In fact, after orthogonalizing to the information
contained in the open-buy volume, the remaining component in the Lee-Ready put-call ratio
possesses predictability in a direction that is opposite to information-based predictability.
This contrarian predictability for the put-call ratio is typically hypothesized for the index
option market: when put volume is high relative to call volume, market participants are
taken to be getting too bearish and it is therefore time to go long; when call volume is high
relative to put volume, the market is getting too bullish and it is therefore time to go short.
An important caveat is that the magnitude of this predictability is quite small, so strong
interpretations of it should be avoided.
The additional analyses performed in this section in combination with our results from
the main test, suggest that the economic source of the predictability in our option volume is
not an ineﬃcient de-linking of the stock and option markets. Indeed, the publicly observed
option volume has very little, if any, predictability for future stock prices. The predictability
that it does have seems to reverse and, hence, is consistent with price pressure. As stated
earlier, one important implication of the information-based models is that prices adjust
quickly to the public information contained in the trade process, but not to non-inferable
private information possessed by informed traders. As a result, the price adjustment to
private information is slower. The results in Figure 2 provide support for this aspect of the
information-based models.
4.4 Concentration of Informed Traders
As speciﬁed in Equation (5), we perform predictive regressions which allow the level of pre-
dictability to vary across size and PIN. The PIN variable is obtained from Soeren Hvidkjaer’s
website for all NYSE and AMEX stocks from 1990 through 2001. As before, we form a time-
series of cross-sectional pools of stocks by requiring a stock to have at least 50 contracts





































































Univariate Regressions using open-buy or Lee-Ready option volume
Bivariate Regression using both open-buy and Lee-Ready option volume
Figure 2: The predictability of publicly and non-publicly observable option vol-
umes for future stock returns. The plots in the ﬁrst row report slope coeﬃcients with
95% conﬁdence intervals for univariate regressions of next-day risk-adjusted stock returns on
open-buy volume put-call ratios or Lee-Ready buyer-initiated volume put-call ratios. The
plots in the second row report the slope coeﬃcients from a bivariate regression of next-day
risk-adjusted stock returns on both open-buy volume and Lee-Ready buyer-initiated volume
put-call ratios.
25of open-buy volume to be included on any particular day. In addition, we require a stock
to have a currently valid PIN measure. As a result, the size of the cross-sectional pools
decreases from an average of 242 stocks to an average of 111 stocks.
As shown in Panel A of Table 5, the predictive regression of next-day risk-adjusted
returns on open-buy put-call ratios yields a signiﬁcant slope coeﬃcient of −35 basis points.
A comparison with the slope coeﬃcient of −53 basis points from our main test reveals
that the predictability of the put-call ratio is weaker in this sample. The reason is that
only stocks with valid PIN measures are included, which excludes the on average smaller
NASDAQ stocks from this subsample. In fact, this size eﬀect can be observed directly in
the second row of Table 5, where an interaction term with size is added in the predictive
regression. The signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient indicates that the predictability is stronger
in smaller stocks and weaker in larger stocks. Speciﬁcally, ﬁxing the put-call ratio, a one unit
increase in ln(size) weakens the absolute magnitude of predictability by 5.27 basis points.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the view that prices in smaller stocks are less eﬃcient and
therefore oﬀer more room for predictability from informed traders.
The PIN variable, which measures the prevalence of informed traders, is the key element
of this regression speciﬁcation. Indeed, adding an interaction term with PIN reveals a very
interesting result. By itself, the put-call ratio provides markedly lower predictability than
before. At the same time, the interaction term with PIN picks up a large degree of pre-
dictability. These ﬁndings imply that the level of put-call ratio predictability depends on
the concentration of informed traders. More speciﬁcally, as PIN increases from 0 to 1, the
corresponding increase in predictability is on average 189 basis points. It is important to
note, however, that this conclusion involves an extrapolation, because no stock in our sample
has PIN as small as 0 or as large as 1. In fact, across the daily cross-sections the average
minimum PIN value is 0.05 and the average maximum PIN value is 0.28 (while the average
median is 0.13). This implies that moving from low PIN stocks to high PIN stocks, the
additional gain in predictability is on the order of 43 basis points.
Since PIN and size have a correlation of −61%, one might suspect that the PIN result
may simply be a restatement of the size result. In order to assess the independent eﬀect of
PIN on predictability, we control for size by adding both interaction terms in the regression.
As can be seen in the bottom row of Panel A of Table 5, the impact of PIN on predictability
decreases somewhat after controlling for size, but the eﬀect remains large and signiﬁcant.
We also perform the same set of predictive regressions after replacing the dependent variable
by the +1-day through +5-day risk-adjusted return in order to examine predictability over
a weekly horizon. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 5. It is interesting to note
that when the interaction term with PIN is added, the predictability from the put-call ratio
by itself vanishes at the weekly horizon. This result has the nice interpretation that when
PIN is close to zero, the option volume does not have any predictive power. Of course, this
is again an extrapolation, since no stock in our sample has PIN equal to 0.
As discussed in the empirical speciﬁcation in Section 2.2, there are two possible expecta-
tions for the PIN result. On the one hand, when there are more informed investors trading,
market makers will adjust prices more quickly and price may tend to adjust in less than
a day so that we will ﬁnd less predictability. On the other hand, with more informed in-
vestors trading, there will be more information coming into the market which will lead to
26Table 5: Predictability conditioning on size and PIN
This table reports the results of daily cross-sectional regressions from 1990-2001.
The dependent variable is the next day four-factor risk-adjusted return. The put-call
ratio is open-buy put volume divided by the sum of open-buy put plus call volume.
Size is the market capitalization of the undelrying stock. PIN is a measure of the
probability that trades on the underlying stock are information-based. Returns
are expressed in basis points, and the t-statistics reported in square brackets are
computed from Fama-MacBeth standard errors. In Panel B, the standard errors are
also corrected for serial correlation by using the Newey-West procedure implemented
with 5 lags.
put-call ratio put-call ratio intercept put-call ratio
× ln(size) × PIN







9.38 −91.50 3.18 −112.4
[11.70] [−2.45] [2.22] [−2.14]
Panel B: +1-day through +5-day returns
15.10 −87.60
[5.16] [−18.92]




14.70 −153.17 .40 −796.1
[4.93] [−1.32] [1.66] [−4.81]
27higher predictability in our tests if it tends to take prices more than a day to adjust. Our
main empirical test clearly indicates that price adjustment to the open-buy volume tends to
take more than a day, and the result in this section suggests that the level of predictability
increases with higher concentrations of informed investors.
Table 6: Predictability of option volume from various investor classes
This table reports the results of daily cross-sectional regressions from 1990-2001. The
dependent variable is the next day four-factor risk-adjusted return. The independent
variables are the put-call ratios computed from the open buy volume of various classes
of investors. The put-call ratio is the put volume divided by the sum of the put and call
volume. Returns are expressed in basis points, and the t-statistics reported in square
brackets are computed from Fama-MacBeth standard errors.
prop public customers avg. num intercept













8.87 4.72 −12.96 −30.39 −24.47
[2.67] [0.99] [−1.71] [−3.53] [−4.35]
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We continue our investigation of informed versus uninformed investors by breaking down
open-buy volume according to which investor class initiated the trading: ﬁrm proprietary
traders, public customers of discount brokers, public customers of full service brokers, and
other public customers. By examining the information content of their option volume sepa-
rately, we may be able to shed some light on who, among the four investor classes, are the
informed traders in the option market.
As speciﬁed in Equation (6), we regress the next-day risk-adjusted returns on the put-
call ratios constructed from the open-buy volumes of the four investor classes. We construct
the cross-sectional pools of stocks by requiring at least 10 contracts of open-buy volume
from the investor class being analyzed.25 As shown in Table 6, the open-buy volume from
customers of full service brokers provides the strongest predictive power in both magnitude
and statistical signiﬁcance. This ﬁnding is not surprising, because, as can be seen from
Table 1, the full service investors account for about 70% of the total open-buy volume. The
25In the speciﬁcation which includes all four investor classes, there must be at least 10 contracts of open-buy
volume from each investor class in order for a stock to be included in a daily cross-section.
28open-buy volume from the customers of discount brokers and others public customers provide
some predictability, but not as much as that from the customers of the full service brokers.
The most surprising result is that the open-buy volume from ﬁrm proprietary traders is not
informative at all about future stock prices. It is important to note that our results speak
only to the issue of whose open-buy option volume is informative and not to the more general
issue of which option market participants are informed. It is possible that ﬁrm proprietary
traders possess information about the underlying stocks but that it is not revealed in their
aggregate open-buy volume, because they use the exchange-traded option market primarily
for hedging purposes.
4.5 Option Leverage
We classify put and call options into out-of-the-money (OTM), near-the-money, and in-the-
money (ITM) using their ratios of strike price to spot price. For example, a 5% OTM call
option has a strike-to-spot ratio of 1.05, while a 5% OTM put option has a strike-to-spot
ratio of 0.95. We deﬁne near-the-money options as calls and puts with strike-to-spot ratios
between 0.97 and 1.03. For each moneyness category, the daily cross-sections include stocks
with at least 20 contracts of open-buy volume in the category on a trade day.
As speciﬁed in Equation (7), we regress the next-day risk-adjusted stock returns on open-
buy put-call ratios constructed from option volume within each category of moneyness. The
results are reported in Panel A of Table 7 where moving from top to bottom the options are of
decreasing leverage. It is very interesting that moving from top to bottom the predictability
is also decreasing in both magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance. For example, using open-
buy volume put-call ratios constructed from options that are more than 10% OTM yields
a slope coeﬃcient of −44.7 basis points with a t-statistic of −29.6. Decreasing the leverage
by one notch to options that are between 3% to 10% OTM, the information content for
next-day stock returns is cut by about half. As we move down the panel to options with
successively less leverage, predictability continues to weaken.
We extend our analysis further by examining the information content of option volume
as a function of time-to-expiration. For a given level of moneyness, short-dated options
oﬀer considerably higher leverage than long-dated options. As shown in Panel B of Table 7,
the predictability of option volume decreases with increasing time-to-expiration. This result
is consistent with informed investors tending to trade more leveraged options. It is also
consistent with the fact that if one possessed information that was likely to make its way
into stock prices in the short-run (which is the type of information identiﬁed in this paper),
it would be natural to trade short-dated options.
Finally, while both the moneyness and time-to-expiration results are consistent with
informed option investors preferring more highly levered contracts, it should be pointed out
that the relative liquidity across the various moneyness and maturity categories might also
contribute to their choices. For equity options, OTM options are typically more liquid than
ITM options, and short-dated options are typically more liquid than long-dated ones. For
example, in our sample, 23% of the volume comes from options that are more than 10% OTM
but only 12% comes from options that are more than 10% ITM. Similarly, 43% of the volume
comes from options with fewer than 30 days to expiration while only 9% of the volume is
29Table 7: Predictability of open-buy volume from options with varying moneyness
and expiration
This table reports the results of daily cross-sectional regressions from 1990-2001. The de-
pendent variable is the next day four-factor risk-adjusted return. The independent variable
is the put-call ratio computed from the open-buy volume of options of varying moneyness
or expiration. The put-call ratio is the put volume divided by the sum of the put and
call volume. Returns are expressed in basis points, and the t-statistics reported in square
brackets are computed from Fama-MacBeth standard errors.
avg. num contract type intercept put-call ratio
of stocks
Panel A: Moneyness
14.65 -44.67 above 10% OTM
[13.06] [−29.57]
207






-4.79 -2.71 3% to 10% ITM
[−5.07] [−1.85]
125
-6.21 7.95 above 10% ITM
[−6.10] [3.52]
134
Panel B: Time to Expiration
8.77 −34.83 under 30 days
[11.04] [−31.20]
382
7.71 −28.52 30 to 59 days
[9.57] [−24.64]
328
6.50 −19.92 60 to 89 days
[7.87] [−15.91]
251
6.25 −17.40 90 to 179 days
[7.37] [−13.16]
219
4.40 −6.91 above 179 days
[4.38] [−3.63]
106
30from options with more than 179 days to expiration. It is interesting, however, to observe
that while liquidity, as measured by trading volume, is comparable for the 10% OTM, 3%
to 10% OTM, and near-the-money categories, the informativeness of their trading volume
is not. In particular, among these three moneyness categories, the 10% OTM options are
slightly less liquid but the information content of their option volume is the highest. This
seems to suggest that, above and beyond liquidity, leverage does play a role in informed
traders’ choice of which contracts to trade.
4.6 Information in Other Option Volume Types
We now examine the information content of the other option volume types: open-sell, close-
buy, and close-sell. When in possession of a positive private signal about an underlying stock,
an investor can buy fresh call options (which adds contracts to open-buy call volume) or sell
fresh put options (which adds contracts to open-sell put volume). If informed traders bring
private information to the open-sell volume, we would expect a positive slope coeﬃcient on
the open-sell put-call ratio in the predictive regression.26 The results reported in Table 8
show that the coeﬃcient for open-sell volume is indeed positive and signiﬁcant. The level of
predictability, however, is much lower than that observed from the open-buy volume. This
can be explained in part by the fact when buying an option, the worst case scenario is losing
the option premium while the upside gain is substantial if the private signal turns out to be
correct. When selling an option, on the other hand, the best case scenario is retaining the
option premium, while the downside loss can be substantial if the private signal turns out
to be incorrect.
Informed traders can also close their existing option positions and thereby bring their
information to the close-buy and close-sell option volume. Compared to the open trades,
however, the information content from closing trades may be lower because traders can only
use information to close positions if they happen to have appropriate positions open at the
time they become informed. Table 8 indicates that the predictability from the close-buy
volume is of the correct sign but very small in magnitude and insigniﬁcant while the pre-
dictability from the close-sell volume is similar to that from the open-sell volume.27 Overall,
the information in open-buy volume is clearly the most informative.
4.7 Information in Index Option Trading
We also examine the information content of option trading on three broad market indices: the
S&P 100 (OEX), S&P 500 (SPX), and Nasdaq-100 (NDX) indices. Studying the index option
markets allows us to present evidence on whether investors possess information about future
26This stands in contrast to the open-buy put-call ratio which has been the main focus of the paper where
information is associated with a negative coeﬃcient.
27The lack of predictability in the close-buy volume may result from the fact that it is not unusual for short
option positions to be opened to hedge bets made directly in the underlying stock. For example, Lakonishok,
Lee, and Poteshman (2004) argue that many short calls positions are part of covered call strategies which
investors enter into as a conservative way to make a long bet on an underlying stock. More generally, to the
extent that option volume contains such “complex” trades, the option signals will be biased against their
expected informational content and the predictability result will be weakened by such noisy signals.
31Table 8: Predictability of various types of option volume
This table reports the results of daily cross-sectional regressions from 1990-2001. The
dependent variable is the next day four-factor risk-adjusted return. The independent
variable is the put-call ratios computed from various types of option volume. The put-
call ratio is the put volume divided by the sum of the put and call volume. Returns are
expressed in basis points, and the t-statistics reported in square brackets are computed
from Fama-MacBeth standard errors.
avg. num volume type intercept put-call ratio
of stocks
12.1 −52.6 open buy
[12.50] [−32.90]
242
−11.02 0 .0 open sell
[−13.30] [12.40]
253
−5.3 −0.9 close buy
[−5.06] [−0.46]
147
−17.72 7 .4 close sell
[−18.70] [14.60]
175
market wide stock price movements. Although we found signiﬁcant informed trading at the
individual stock level, it seems less plausible that investors would have superior information
at the market level. It also runs counter to the common belief that investors use index
options mostly for hedging rather than speculating.28
We perform univariate regressions of the next-day index returns on open-buy put-call
ratios using volumes from the four investor classes separately. If there is informed trading
in the index option market, we expect to see a signiﬁcant negative slope coeﬃcient. The
results, which are reported in Table 9, do not provide any evidence of informed trading in
the index option market.
Finally, it is also interesting to mention that the conventional wisdom on Wall Street is
to use the put-call ratio on index options as a contrarian rather than a momentum signal.
That is, when the put-call ratio becomes high, it is supposed that the market has become
too bearish and it is time to take a long position on the market. On the other hand, when
the put-call ratio becomes low, the market has become too bullish and it is time to short.
Indeed, this contrarian use of the put-call ratio ﬁnds some support in the univariate regression
results reported in Table 9. For the Nasdaq-100 index, the option volumes of customers from
discount and other brokerage ﬁrms have a positive and signiﬁcant predictability for the next-
day returns of NDX, indicating a next-day increase (decrease) in NDX when such customers’
28An interesting distinction between equity and index options can be seen in the diﬀerence in investor
composition reported in Table 1. In particular, we see that ﬁrm proprietary traders make up over 20% of
the total volume in the option market for the S&P 500 index and the Nasdaq-100 index, while their average
participation in the equity options market is less than 10%.
32Table 9: Predictability of index option volume
This table reports the results of univariate time-series regressions from 1990-2001. The
dependent variable is the next day index return. The independent variable is the put-
call ratio computed from the open-buy volume of various classes of investors. The put-
call ratio is the put volume divided by the sum of the put and call volume. Returns are
expressed in basis points, and the t-statistics reported in square brackets are computed
from standard errors corrected for hetroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
prop public customers
Index
traders discount full service other
−8.5 10.2 −1.51 . 8 SPX
[−1.13] [1.08] [−0.14] [0.24]
7.3 43.7 64.5 −5.6 OEX
[0.90] [3.12] [3.60] [−0.46]
-3.2 46.5 12.1 36.0 NDX
[−0.26] [3.11] [0.69] [3.09]
put volume is high (low) relative to their call volume.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we examined the informational content of option volume for future stock price
movements. Our main objectives were to identify informed trading in the option market
and to elucidate the process of price discovery. We found strong and unambiguous evidence
that there is informed trading in the option market. Moreover, we were able to partition the
signals obtained from option volume into various components and to investigate the process
of price adjustment at a greater depth than previous empirical studies.
Our ﬁndings indicate that it takes several weeks for stock prices to adjust fully to the
information embedded in option volume. The main economic source of this predictability,
however, does not appear to be market ineﬃciency. Rather than a disconnection between
the stock and option markets, the predictability that we document appears to be driven
by valuable non-public information which traders bring to the option market. We further
investigated the relationship between the predictability and two variables that play a key
role in information-based theoretical models: the concentration of informed traders and the
leverage of option contracts. We found that, in accordance with the theoretical models,
the predictability is increasing in the concentration of informed traders and the leverage
of option contracts. Applying the same predictive analysis to the index option market,
however, yielded no evidence of informed trading. This is indeed consistent with the view
that informed traders tend to possess ﬁrm speciﬁc rather than market-wide information.
This paper has focused on the information in option volume about the future direction
33of underlying stock prices. Investors could also use the option market to trade on infor-
mation about the future volatility of underlying stocks. Indeed, since the option market is
uniquely suited for making volatility trades, investigating the existence and nature of volatil-
ity information in option volume appears to be a particularly promising avenue for future
research.
34References
Amin, K. I. and C. M. C. Lee (1997). Option trading, price discovery, and earnings news
dissemination. Contemporary Accounting Research 14, 153–192.
Back, K. (1993). Asymmetric Information and Options. Review of Financial Studies 6,
435–472.
Bates, D. (2001). The Market Price of Crash Risk. Working Paper, University of Iowa.
Biais, B. and P. Hillion (1994). Insider and Liquidity trading in stock and options markets.
Review of Financial Studies 74, 743–780.
Black, F. (1975). Fact and Fantasy in the Use of Options. Financial Analysts Journal 31,
36–41, 61–72.
Black, F. and M. Scholes (1973). The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities. Journal
of Political Economy 81, 637–654.
Brennan, M. and H. Cao (1996). Information, Trade, and Derivative Securities. Review of
Financial Studies 9, 163–208.
Buraschi, A. and A. Jiltsov (2002). Uncertainty, Volatility and Option Markets. Working
Paper, London Business School.
Cao, C., Z. Chen, and J. M. Griﬃn (2003). Informational Content of Option Volume Prior
to Takeovers. Journal of Business, forthcoming.
Chakravarty, S., H. Gulen, and S. Mayhew (2002). Informed Trading in Stock and Option
Markets. Working Paper, University of Georgia.
Chan, K., Y. P. Chung, and W.-M. Fong (2002). The Informational Role of Stock and
Option Volume. Review of Financial Studies 15, 1049–1075.
Chordia, T. and B. Swaminathan (2000). Trading Volume and Cross-Autocorrelations in
Stock Returns. Journal of Finance 55, 913–935.
Easley, D., S. Hvidkjaer, and M. O’Hara (2002). Is Information Risk a Determinant of
Asset Returns? Journal of Finance 57, 2185–2222.
Easley, D., N. Kiefer, and M. O’Hara (1997). One Day in the Life of a Very Common
Stock. Review of Financial Studies 10, 805–835.
Easley, D. and M. O’Hara (1987). Price, Trade Size, and Information in Securities Markets.
Journal of Financial Economics 19, 69–90.
Easley, D., M. O’Hara, and P. Srinivas (1998). Option Volume and Stock Prices: Evidence
on Where Informed Traders Trade. Journal of Finance 53, 431–465.
Fama, E. and J. MacBeth (1973). Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests. Journal
of Political Economy 81, 607–636.
Figlewski, S. and G. Webb (1993). Options, Short Sales, and Market Completeness. Jour-
nal of Finance 48, 761–777.
35Franke, G., R. Stapleton, and M. Subrahmanyam (1998). Who Buys and Who Sells Op-
tions: The Role of Options in an Economy with Background Risk. Journal of Economic
Theory 82, 89–109.
Gervais, S., R. Kaniel, and D. Mingelgrin (2001). The High-Volume Return Premium.
Journal of Finance 56, 877–919.
Glosten, L. and P. Milgrom (1985). Bid, Ask, and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market
with Heterogenously Informed Traders. Journal of Financial Economics 14, 71–100.
Grossman, S. (1988). An Analysis of the Implications for Stock and Future Price Volatility
of Program Trading and Dynamic Hedging Strategies. Journal of Business 61, 275–298.
Haugh, M. and A. Lo (2001). Asset Allocation and Derivatives. Quantitative Finance 1,
45–72.
John, K., A. Koticha, R. Narayanan, and M. Subrahmanyam (2000). Margin Rules, In-
formed Trading and Price Dynamics. Working Paper, Stern School of Business, New
York University.
Kraus, A. and M. Smith (1996). Heterogeneous Beliefs and the Eﬀect of Replicatable
Options on Asset Prices. Review of Financial Studies 9, 723–756.
Lakonishok, J., I. Lee, and A. Poteshman (2004). Investor Behavior in the Option Market.
Working Paper, Department of Finance, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Lee, C. M. C. and M. J. Ready (1991). Inferring Trade Direction from Intraday Data.
Journal of Finance 46, 733–746.
Liu, J. and J. Pan (2003). Dynamic Derivative Strategies. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 69, 410–430.
Lo, A. and C. MacKinlay (1990). When are Contrarian Proﬁts Due to Stock Market
Overreaction? Review of Financial Studies 3, 175–205.
Manaster, S. and R. Rendleman (1982). Option Prices as Predictors of Equilibrium Stock
Prices. Journal of Finance 37, 1043–1057.
Mayhew, S., A. Sarin, and K. Shastri (1995). The Allocation of Informed Trading Across
Related Markets: An Analysis of the Impact of Changes in Equity-Option Margin
Requirements. Journal of Finance 50, 1635–1653.
Newey, W. K. and K. D. West (1987). A Simple Positive Semi-Deﬁnite, Heteroskedasticity
and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix. Econometrica 29, 229–256.
O’Hara, M. (1995). Market Microstructure Theory. Blackwell Publishers.
Stephan, J. and R. Whaley (1990). Intraday Price Change and Trading Volume Relations
in the Stock and Stock Option Markets. Journal of Finance 45, 191–220.
Vijh, A. M. (1990). Liquidity of the CBOE equity options. Journal of Finance 45, 1157–
1179.
36